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ABSTRACT
One of the key areas where behavioral economics offers major insights into developing successful policy 
involves issues of fairness. Taxation offers many examples, ranging from the Boston Tea Party of 1773 to the 
UK’s unsuccessful community charge, often called the ‘poll tax’, of the early 1990s, where a failure to ap-
preciate fully taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness led to unexpected outcomes. The use of behavioral economics 
to supplement mainstream economic analysis might not only reduce the risks of such tax disasters but also 
improve the development of tax reform more generally. This paper shows how such additional explanatory 
power contributes to our understanding of the success or failure of UK tax policy arising from the ‘natural 
experiments’ of the successful introduction of value added tax in 1973 and the contrasting difficulties associated 
with the community charge in 1990 and, more recently, the abolition of the 10% rate of income tax in 2008.
The Importance of 
Fairness in Tax Policy:
Behavioral Economics and 
the UK Experience
Simon James, Business School, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
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1. INTRODUCTION
James E. Meade, joint winner of the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1977, 
once stated: ‘I am an economist and have tried to 
give you an economic solution for an economic 
problem. Please do not argue that I am a rotten 
economist on the grounds that the economic 
solution is politically unacceptable. The really 
difficult part of our present problem is political’ 
(Meade, 1979, p. 9). To achieve successful tax 
reform a political solution may also be required 
as indicated by many episodes from the famous 
Boston Tea Party of 1773 and its role in the 
developments leading to the American War of 
Independence (see, for example, Labree, 1964) 
to the ill-fated UK community charge or poll 
tax examined below.
Economics has not always had such clear 
distinctions of the sort described by Meade. 
Edwin Cannan (1946, p. 4) took the view that 
there ‘is no precise line between economic and 
non-economic satisfactions, and therefore the 
province of economics cannot be marked out 
by a row of posts or a fence like political terri-
tory or a landed property.’ Indeed, Adam Smith 
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has been described as a behavioral economist 
- his ‘world is not inhabited by dispassionate 
rational purely self-interested agents, but rather 
by multidimensional and realistic human be-
ings’ (Ashraf et al., 2005, p. 142). However, 
as an academic discipline, economics shifted 
substantially towards a narrower approach, 
beginning in the 19th Century. As Edgeworth 
(1881, p. 6) put it: ‘Economics investigates the 
arrangements between agents each tending to his 
own maximum utility’ and the ‘first principle of 
Economics is that every agent is actuated only 
by self-interest’ (p. 16). As Jevons (1881, p. 
581) remarked: the ‘fearless manner in which 
Mr Edgeworth applies the conceptions and 
methods of mathematical physics to illustrate, 
if not solve, the problems of hedonic science, 
is quite surprising’. Nonetheless, it was an ap-
proach that was widely followed for a range 
of reasons, not least because of the appeal of 
precise analysis which can also generate useful 
and powerful theories. However, there have 
been many distinguished economists who have 
acknowledged the possible role for behavioral 
factors. For instance, Herbert Simon (1986, p. 
S299) wrote ‘it is sometimes useful to enrich 
the model of economic agents by explicitly 
introducing a behavioral factor that is ignored 
in the standard theory’. A very important area 
consists of issues of fairness. Kahneman et al. 
(1986, p.S285) point out that the absence of 
considerations regarding fairness from standard 
economic theory is one of the most striking 
contrasts between economic theory and other 
social sciences. It also means that standard 
economic analysis has significant limitations 
and in recent years behavioral economics has 
begun to extend the study of economics back 
towards territory it once occupied.
The number of contributions from be-
havioral economics has grown enormously in 
recent years. Introductions are provided by both 
Schwartz (2008) and Wilkinson (2008). Altman 
(2006), Loewenstein (2007) and Maital (2007) 
have edited books of behavioral economics pa-
pers. Taxation has also been the focus of analy-
sis. McCaffery and Slemrod (2006) produced a 
book of papers on behavioral public finance and 
James (2006) a paper on behavioral economics 
and tax in general. Regarding particular aspects 
of taxation with respect to behavioral econom-
ics, Congdon et al. (2009) examined tax policy, 
Reeson and Dunstall (2009) the Australian tax 
and transfer system and James (2012b) some 
implications for tax administration.
Behavioral economics has been described 
as increasing the ‘explanatory power of eco-
nomics by providing it with more realistic 
psychological foundations’ (Camerer & Loew-
enstein, 2004, p. 3) though it also draws on other 
disciplines. Its approach involves modifying 
‘the standard economic model to account for 
psychophysical properties of preference and 
judgement, which create limits on rational 
calculation, willpower and greed’ (Camerer & 
Malmendier, 2007, p. 235) and further analysis 
is presented by Tomer (2007).
Fairness is a very significant aspect of 
behavioral economics and, to gain an idea of its 
relative importance, the present author surveyed 
the indexes of three standard behavioral eco-
nomics texts - Camerer, Lowenstein and Rabin 
(2004), Schwartz (2008) and Wilkinson (2008) 
- to measure the number of pages referenced 
for each topic. Of course, this was not an exact 
exercise. A reference does not directly indicate 
the importance of a topic. Many of the concepts 
overlap – for example ‘decision-making’ is part 
of a variety of effects and there are differences 
in the way the books are indexed. Nevertheless, 
the number of pages on which different concepts 
were referenced varied enormously. Fairness 
was the topic the most frequently referenced 
by far – there were references to fairness on 
136 pages. In addition, ‘inequality aversion’ 
- another description of fairness - had its own 
references to 44 pages of the three texts. It might 
be noted that references to fairness considerably 
exceeded those to the second most referenced 
topic, which was prospect theory (mentioned 
on 106 pages). Furthermore, the references to 
fairness included many pages of immediate 
relevance to the contribution of behavioral 
economics to tax reform.
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The UK has experienced many natural 
experiments in tax reform. These include the 
introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 1973 
which was successful. It also includes the 
unsuccessful community charge, most usually 
called the ‘poll tax’, which was introduced in 
Scotland in 1989 and England and Wales in 
1990, It did not last long and was replaced in 
1993. In fact, the poll tax was such a failure 
it also played a part in the downfall of Mrs. 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister (Gibson, 
1990). A more recent example is the abolition 
of the 10% income tax rate in 2008 which the 
taxpaying public considered to be so unfair 
on low income taxpayers that the government 
finally made further changes to offset the 
objections. The comparison between the suc-
cessful introduction of VAT and the failure of 
the community charge has already been used to 
illustrate the contribution of behavioral econom-
ics to tax reform (James, 2012a). It has been 
said with regard to public administration that 
a ‘good crisis should not go to waste’. In the 
present context, a serious tax disaster should 
not be wasted and this paper concentrates on 
the particular issue of fairness. VAT, the poll 
tax and the abolition of the 10% tax rate were 
all based on mainstream analysis of economic 
efficiency but their success or failure seems to 
have been primarily determined by the extent 
to which they matched taxpayers’ views of 
fairness.
This paper therefore summarises issues 
of fairness in relation to public finance in the 
following section. The introduction of VAT in 
the UK is then examined in that light in Section 
3, the community charge in Section 4 and the 
abolition of 10% tax rate in Section 5. Some 
conclusions regarding the role of fairness in 
taxation are presented in Section 6.
2. FAIRNESS, BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS AND TAXATION
There is substantial evidence that economic 
agents take account of fairness rather than 
simply maximising short run profits though, of 
course, this could enable them to maximise long 
run profits (Kahneman et al., 2004). However 
the view that individuals are motivated purely 
by immediate self-interest cannot explain a 
range of empirical anomalies (for example see 
Wilkinson, 2008). Observations are made of 
individuals acting in an altruistic way – where 
they benefit from the welfare of others even at 
a cost to themselves. The opposite behaviour 
can also be observed – spiteful actions where 
individuals will incur a cost in order to harm 
others. Different models have been designed 
to incorporate fairness and social preferences. 
Inequality-aversion models take account of 
individuals’ envy of those who are better off 
than themselves and also that they feel guilty 
if they are better off than others. There are also 
reciprocity models where kindness (or the op-
posite!) depends on the perceived kindness of 
others. Other approaches include that of evolu-
tionary psychology. Co-operation and concepts 
of fairness may have originally developed in 
hunter-gatherer groups and later more widely as 
an important factor in the success of the human 
race in a sometimes harsh environment. It may 
also, of course, be reinforced by the punishment 
of defectors and free riders.
The distribution of resources has long 
been a feature of public finance analysis. The 
economic justification for the public sector was 
summarised in Musgrave’s (1959) classic three 
branch model consisting of allocation, distribu-
tion and stabilisation. The stabilisation branch 
is not of direct relevance in the present context 
but the allocation and distribution branches 
well describe two complementary approaches 
to tax policy. Allocation in this context relates 
to the inefficiencies in the market system and 
improving the allocation of economic resources, 
for example regarding the provision of public 
goods and dealing with external effects. As 
Musgrave (2008, p. 237) describes it, the al-
location branch mirrors the spirit of the market 
and attempts to increase efficiency based on 
consumer preferences.
With the distribution branch, public finance 
leaves ‘the safe haven of Pareto optimality’ 
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(Musgrave ibid.) and moves to the less tangible 
area of distributive justice. This is concerned 
with the distribution of income and wealth. In 
terms of the revenue side of public finance, fair 
taxation has frequently been based on ideas re-
lated to ability to pay and there has been much 
discussion in terms of the sacrifice of taxation 
and whether fair taxation should be related to 
absolute, proportional or marginal sacrifice. The 
concept of horizontal equity, that people in the 
same position should be treated alike, may not 
have independent normative content (McDan-
iel & Repetti, 1993) but it is often the basis of 
much discussion (and frequently opposition to) 
particular aspects of taxation.
This classification is a useful basis on which 
to integrate the efficiency and equity aspects tax 
policy as illustrated in Figure 1. The allocation 
branch is concerned with economic efficiency 
and this is conventionally analysed using the 
assumption that individuals maximize utility. 
The distribution branch relates to equity and 
tax incidence and how these are affected by 
public expenditure and taxation. Rather than 
seeing taxpayers simply as calculators of their 
own economic gains and losses, when equity 
is also considered, taxpayers might be better 
considered in a more complex role of members 
of society with a range of possible views re-
garding fairness and the distribution of income.
An illustration of the importance of a bal-
anced tax policy is the success of VAT in the UK 
and this is examined in the following section. 
This is followed by an indication of how badly 
things can go wrong if tax policy is not developed 
in this way as with the UK community charge.
Figure 1. Different approaches to tax policy
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3. VALUE ADDED TAX
The proposal for the introduction of VAT in the 
UK was based firmly on mainstream economic 
principles. One of the main principles was that 
the tax should, as far as possible, be levied at 
the same rate on all goods and services in order 
to reduce economic distortions. Other argu-
ments for introducing VAT included European 
tax harmonisation, enabling UK exports to be 
competitively priced by removing tax altogether 
from exports and the self-policing characteris-
tics of value added taxes (James & Alley, 2009).
Historically, indirect taxes tended to be 
levied on goods rather services (Webber & Wil-
davsky, 2006). The anomaly of taxing goods but 
not services was less pronounced in developing 
economies when services generally formed a 
relatively small proportion of output that was 
easily taxable. However as the service sector 
grew, so did the distortion. In the UK in 1966 
there was an attempt to rectify the situation by 
the introduction of the Selective Employment 
Tax (Reddaway, 1973) which discriminated 
against services but this was a very unsatisfac-
tory tax and so contributed to the case for VAT. 
Value added tax can avoid many economic 
distortions if it is levied at a single rate on all 
goods and services but, as indicated below, this 
principle had to be modified enormously in the 
process of adapting the tax to take account of 
taxpayers’ views of fairness.
This was possible since considerable care 
and time was taken regarding the development 
and implementation of VAT in the UK. The 
Government published a Green Paper (1971) 
giving details of the proposed tax two years 
before VAT was to be introduced. A period of 
consultation followed which generated a large 
number of contributions and led to the publi-
cation of a White Paper (1972) that set out the 
proposals in far more detail. The next stage 
was the provision of considerable publicity 
and taxpayer assistance which did a great deal 
to ease the introduction of VAT.
Such an approach was taken because value 
added tax was new to the taxpaying population 
and potentially complex in its operation. It 
has been examined in detail by Aaron, (1981), 
Lindholm (1980), Prest (1980), Schenk and 
Oldman (2007) and James and Alley (2009). 
The tax works on the basis that suppliers are 
required to charge VAT on their outputs and 
deduct VAT already paid on their inputs so that 
only tax on the value they have added is remitted 
to the tax authorities. Relief from VAT can be 
given in two main ways. One is by including 
particular goods or services in the VAT system 
but applying a zero rate. In this way goods and 
services can be completely free of tax because 
any VAT on inputs can still be claimed. Hence, 
for example, the advantage of VAT mentioned 
above regarding exports which can be zero 
rated to give them a competitive advantage. The 
other way of favouring supplies is exemption 
whereby particular goods and services are not 
covered by the VAT system at all. This is less 
advantageous than zero rating because, while 
VAT does not have to be charged on exempt 
outputs, the suppliers cannot reclaim any VAT 
paid on their inputs.
The extensive consultation in the UK 
allowed taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness 
considerable influence in the development of 
the final structure of VAT. Many concessions 
were made by the use of the zero rate or exemp-
tions. It became clear that, despite the economic 
advantages of a broadly based tax levied at a 
single rate, the taxation of certain items was 
simply not acceptable to UK taxpayers. This 
included food, children’s clothes and domestic 
fuel and power. By avoiding the taxation of a 
whole range of such items, VAT became levied 
on only just over half of consumer expenditure 
(Davies & Kay, 1985) and the proportion has 
not increased a great deal since its introduction. 
Nevertheless, this had the political benefit that 
the effects on income distribution were much 
more acceptable to taxpayers than some had 
predicted. This was partly because those on 
low incomes spent a relatively high proportion 
of their income on items not subject to VAT. It 
was also partly because those on higher incomes 
spent a higher proportion on items that were.
Nevertheless there are almost certain to 
be difficulties where different items are treated 
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differently for tax purposes. Not only does this 
increase the complexity of the tax in itself but 
further complexity arises as consumers try to 
take advantage of the disparities and the gov-
ernment responds by restricting their ability to 
do so. An example is zero rating for children’s 
clothing which might benefit small adults but not 
large children. It is therefore subject to detailed 
regulations. These cover whether something can 
be defined as an article of clothing or footwear, 
whether it was designed for young children and 
whether it is suitable only for young children. It 
can be very difficult to achieve the right degree 
of regulation. The less regulation there is in such 
cases the more likely the concession will have 
unintended beneficiaries. However the more 
regulation there is, the less likely the concession 
will always reach the intended beneficiaries. 
What is clear is that there are significant costs 
involved in using the tax system as a policy 
instrument in this way but these can be accept-
able in the interests of fairness.
The result has been a tax that is consider-
ably more complex than originally envisaged 
and further changes have been made over the 
years. These began soon after the tax was intro-
duced in 1973. One related to the concession for 
food which originally included confectionary, 
ice cream, soft drinks and potato crisps. These 
became subject to VAT in 1974. Such changes 
further illustrated the point that when substitutes 
are taxed at different rates there is not only an 
economic distortion but also potentially a dif-
ficulty in maintaining the integrity of the tax. A 
well reported example was the tax treatment of 
small cakes with chocolate coverings. Although 
cakes were subject to the zero rate of tax, the 
revenue authorities treated them as chocolate 
covered biscuits and taxed them at the standard 
rate of VAT. As one implication of the case later 
came before the House of Lords in 2005 on its 
way to the European Court of Justice, Lord 
Hoffman said:
The supply of food is in general zero-rated for 
VAT... But there are exceptions. One exception 
is confectionery…. But there is an exception to 
that exception: cakes or biscuits are in general 
also zero-rated. There is however an exception 
to that exception to the exception, namely bis-
cuits wholly or partly covered with chocolate. 
They are standard-rated. (Marks and Spencer 
plc v. Customs and Excise, [2005] UKHL 53)
Naturally this led to some serious dispute 
about the definition of a biscuit and the defini-
tion of a cake. One supplier held that biscuits go 
soft when stale but cakes go hard. The supplier 
also baked a special large version of its cake/
biscuit in an attempt to show that it was really a 
small cake. The authorities accepted this argu-
ment in 1994 but the whole thing became much 
more complex and further disputes continued 
for many years. Whether such an item of food 
was a cake rather than a biscuit depended not 
just on the test of staleness but also on factors 
such as appeal to children, ingredients, texture, 
size, marketing, presentation, the name and the 
manufacturing process. Such cases provide 
further evidence that taxpayers prefer taxes they 
consider fair, even if it involves such economic 
and administrative burdens.
Taxpayer preferences regarding fairness 
have also prevented other attempts to extend 
the VAT base. For instance, when VAT was in-
troduced, domestic fuel and power were taxed 
at the zero rate. However, as worries about the 
use of fossil fuels increased, the rate of tax 
on domestic fuel and power was increased to 
8 per cent in 1994 and it was also stated that 
it would be further increased to the full rate. 
Nevertheless it soon became clear that this was 
not politically acceptable and, indeed, the rate 
was reduced to 5 per cent from 1995. This lower 
rate has also been used with respect to a whole 
range of items from energy saving materials 
for home insulation to children’s car safety 
seats. Of course, such differential taxation may 
increase economic distortions but it does make 
the tax appear fairer to taxpayers and therefore 
more acceptable.
The clear lesson from the VAT experience in 
the UK is that while a broadly based single rate 
of tax has economic advantages, responsiveness 
to taxpayer views indicated that perceptions of 
fairness were also important. The result has been 
Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics, 3(1), 1-12, January-March 2014   7
widespread acceptance of the tax and, compared 
to other taxes, relatively little resistance when 
the rates of VAT have been increased. For ex-
ample, it was quite remarkable that the increase 
of VAT from 17.5% to 20% in January 2011, 
which was expected to raise an additional £13 
billion, aroused remarkably little observable 
protest or resistance as compared to many other 
tax changes which involved raising much less 
revenue. There seems to be little doubt that UK 
taxpayers are much less concerned about the 
efficiency and complexity of taxation than they 
are about what they consider to be its fairness.
4. THE COMMUNITY 
CHARGE OR POLL TAX
There is little doubt that the UK community 
charge provides a vivid example where con-
siderations of economic efficiency were given 
precedence over fairness with disastrous results. 
It was to be a major source of local govern-
ment finance and it replaced a local property 
tax that can be traced back to the Elizabethan 
Poor Law of 1601. It was introduced initially 
in Scotland in 1989 and then in England and 
Wales the following year. The tax is described 
in more detail by Smith (1991) and Butler et 
al. (1994) but basically it was levied at the 
same rate on all adults in a local authority area. 
This is why it became known as the ‘poll tax’ 
and led to considerable protest and even civil 
disobedience to such an extent that as soon as 
1991 the government decided to repeal it and 
it was actually replaced in 1993.
Perhaps it was surprising that more care 
had not been taken to ensure the community 
charge was acceptable to taxpayers. The fact 
that its predecessor had survived for nearly 
three centuries should have indicated it was 
a robust form of taxation. However, the com-
munity charge had strong support. It was 
government policy to control public spending 
and around a quarter of this was local public 
spending. Although the previous system of 
local taxation has survived for so long, it was 
thought to create upward bias in local authority 
spending since the beneficiaries of that spending 
outnumbered those who paid the tax. The aim 
of the community charge was therefore was to 
link directly local public spending with local 
tax liability. Individuals could still, of course, 
vote for high spending local councils, but it 
would mean they were voting for higher tax 
bills not just for others but also for themselves.
While it was quite clear that taxpayers 
might not consider fair a tax which demanded 
the same payment from everyone in a local 
area, academic economists did not subject the 
proposals to much serious criticism. This seems 
to be because the tax, apart from fairness, met 
all the mainstream economic criteria for a good 
tax (James & Nobes, 2012). Since everyone paid 
the same amount, the marginal rate of tax and 
therefore the substitution effect were zero and 
the community charge would not normally have 
direct adverse effects on economic efficiency 
or the supply of labour or capital. It also met 
the criteria that could be applied to a good form 
of local taxation. These are all based on the 
idea that local public authorities should have 
a significant degree of autonomy over local 
decisions regarding public spending and taxa-
tion. In addition to meeting the usual economic 
criteria for a good tax, a tax that is suitable for 
local government should therefore have the 
three other characteristics (James, 2004). The 
first is that there should be a tax base large 
enough to generate sufficient finance for local 
authorities. The second is that the tax base has 
to be reasonably spread across jurisdictions 
to avoid revenue sharing arrangements that 
might impede local decision-making. Thirdly, 
the tax should be such that it can be levied at 
different rates in different areas so that local 
areas can decide for themselves the level of 
local taxation and local public spending. The 
community charge met all these criteria well. 
It had a potentially large tax base. It would be 
well distributed if local areas are considered to 
be local populations rather than geographical 
areas. Finally, as with a local property tax, it 
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would be possible for each area to set its own 
rates without fear of serious adverse outcomes 
as a result of different rates in different local 
jurisdictions.
An argument put forward for the commu-
nity charge concerned the benefit approach to 
taxation. In this context it was suggested that 
the local tax burden of individuals ought to be 
related to the benefit they obtained from local 
public spending. A similar point was concerned 
with accountability. The Layfield Committee 
(1976), among others, had examined increas-
ing the accountability of local government to 
the local electorate by replacing some central 
government grants to local authorities by higher 
levels of local taxation. Such changes might 
reduce ‘fiscal illusion’ by which voters are not 
aware of the true tax costs of public expenditure 
as the link between local taxation and local 
spending was enhanced (Gemmell et al., 2002).
Despite such theoretically elegant concepts 
deployed in support of the community charge, 
when taxpayers started to receive increased tax 
demands these led very quickly to considerable 
opposition which included widespread refusals 
to pay, public demonstrations and even a major 
riot in London (Smith, 1991; Butler et al., 1994). 
As already indicated above, the community 
charge was a factor in the resignation of Mrs 
Thatcher as Prime Minister in November 1990, 
less than a year following the introduction of the 
tax in England and Wales and her replacement 
by John Major who had promised to review it.
A closer look at the issue indicates a number 
of problems not just with the tax itself but also 
in the form that it was actually introduced. The 
relevance of the benefit approach to taxation is 
limited – as discussed by classical economists 
such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill – not 
least because it is extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to measure the benefit of government 
spending on public goods and so on (James, 
2004). In addition, under the UK community 
charge, every individual paid the same regard-
less of their benefit from local public spend-
ing. Bramley et al. (1989) revisited the theory 
of local public finance and found that it gave 
some, but not overwhelming, support for the 
community charge as a ‘benefit tax’. In examin-
ing household survey evidence Bramley et al., 
came to the conclusion that the incidence of the 
community charge was such that as a benefit 
tax it scored less well than the local property 
tax it replaced. This conclusion was echoed by 
Cullis et al. (1991) looking at the issue from a 
public choice perspective. They considered it 
questionable that voters knew more about the 
poll tax than they did about the local property 
tax and, even if they did, whether the poll tax 
performed better as a benefit related tax. Cul-
lis et al. (1993, p. 423) concluded, while the 
community charge ‘did not conform closely to 
a benefit principle it similarly [failed] to cor-
respond to an ability to pay criterion’. Authors 
such as Vanistendael (1996) have also attributed 
the rejection of the community charge by UK 
taxpayers directly to its failure to reflect the 
ability to pay principle. As already stated, tax 
liability was not related to individuals’ financial 
circumstances (except for some relief for the 
poorest) and fell relatively heavily on those 
with the lowest incomes. Not only was such a 
tax considered by the public to be unfair, but 
the objections were magnified by the relatively 
high level of the tax and that a large proportion 
of the population were made worse off while 
the media gave attention to the fact that many 
of the wealthy were made very much better off.
The process of introducing the tax was 
also likely to increase opposition. Originally 
it had been thought best to phase the change 
over a number of years to allow taxpayers and 
their expectations time to adjust. However in 
the end it was decided to replace the existing 
local property tax with the community charge 
in a single step. This sudden substantial change 
magnified another reason for the failure of the 
tax. One of the original intentions was that it 
should be a direct tax strongly perceptible to 
taxpayers and thus reduce fiscal illusion. Indeed 
it did, and its very perceptibility was part of the 
cause of the vehement adverse public reaction 
(McGee, 1998). However perceptibility was not 
the only reason for that response since, of course, 
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other direct taxes, particularly income tax, do 
not normally arouse the same level of hostility. A 
further failure was to spend sufficient resources 
making case for the community charge to the 
public (Gibson, 1989). Taking the nature of the 
tax as well as its unfortunate introduction, as 
Smith (1991, p. 435) concludes, the tax was ‘a 
salutary lesson in the importance of designing 
tax schemes that enjoy widespread acceptance’.
5. THE ABOLITION OF THE 
10% INCOME TAX RATE
More recently in the UK there was the case of 
the abolition of the lowest rate of income tax 
of 10%. In 2007, the government proposed 
to simplify the income tax by increasing the 
lowest rate to bring it in line with the main 
20% rate and this came into effect in 2008. 
Again there was an intellectual argument on 
efficiency grounds in terms of simplifying the 
income tax structure. However, the government 
failed to anticipate the strength of the adverse 
public response that it was unfair that taxpay-
ers on low incomes would be starting to pay 
income tax at 20% rather than 10%. Members 
of Parliament successfully campaigned against 
the new arrangement and finally this was 
modified through an increased personal tax 
free allowance to compensate those adversely 
affected. A higher personal allowance is more 
effective in helping those on low incomes than 
the 10% tax band since it takes many of those 
on the lowest incomes out of tax altogether. The 
eventual result was therefore an improvement 
(Johnson, 2008) but it would have been far bet-
ter for tax morale, and the government itself, 
if more account had been taken of taxpayers’ 
views of fairness at an earlier stage. Instead, the 
issues involved were left to emerge in a chaotic 
political process until public opinion finally 
prevailed, though with unintended side-effects 
(Adam et al., 2008). There does not seem to be 
much doubt that taking account of taxpayers’ 
perceptions of fairness at the beginning would 
have improved the chances of an orderly, well 
designed and acceptable reform.
6. CONCLUSION
The fiscal experiences examined in this paper 
indicate that behavioral economics can make 
a very important contribution to tax reform. 
The development and implementation of value 
added tax in the UK provides a major illustration 
of the advantages of following a balanced ap-
proach to tax reform, even if it means consider-
able modification from the ideal tax in terms of 
economic efficiency to one that fits more closely 
to taxpayer views of fairness. VAT in the UK 
has continued to be a very successful tax even 
though the main rate has now been increased to 
20 per cent. The failure of the community charge 
in the UK was a vivid and sometimes violent 
example of the advantages of taking account of 
taxpayer views on fairness before rather than 
after a particular tax reform has taken place. 
However, the political upheaval associated 
with the abolition of the 10% income tax rate 
in 2008 suggests there is still considerable room 
for improvement in the way taxes are reformed. 
One other conclusion from these experiences is 
that it is insufficient to assume most taxpayers 
will make their views known before tax legis-
lation actually takes effect. In the case of VAT 
there was a deliberate attempt to take account 
of different views in designing the tax and this 
worked well. In the case of the community 
charge, such lobbying as there was during the 
development of the tax came from very narrow 
sections of the taxpaying population. Although 
the form of the community charge was known 
well before it was actually implemented, the 
full force of the public response did not come 
until the tax demands were actually received 
by taxpayers. By then it was too late to ensure 
the success of the reform.
Finally, there have been suggestions to the 
European Commission that VAT exemptions 
and reduced rates are ‘weakness’ and ‘prob-
lems’ in the VAT system (see, for example, 
European Commission, 2011, p.14). In terms 
of economic efficiency narrowly defined this 
is undoubtedly true. However, to reform VAT 
by limiting the scope of such exemptions and 
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reduced rates may run serious risks of adverse 
taxpayer responses and undesirable outcomes. 
The UK, having got it right the first time with 
VAT, may not welcome such a development 
and its taxpayers certainly would not.
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